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ABSTRACT 
The economy of Burundi is currently under life support and private investment is still in its 
embryonic stage, after a series of civil wars that have characterised Burundi’s post – 
independence era. The political woes that Burundi continues to experience are one of the 
fundamental hindrances to private investment growth and development. Probably, this is the 
reason why most researchers, academicians and observers analyze the situation of Burundi only 
with political glasses; thereby undermining the role played by the economic structure. The 
perspective adopted in this study is quite different: the idea is to present a picture of Burundi 
from an economic point of view, partially leaving politics in the background and yet based on 
empirical evidence. This kind of approach does not imply that politics is unimportant! Our 
humble view is that politics is often constrained or even controlled, by economics! Private 
investment is the backbone of every economy and Burundi cannot be an exception. The study, 
while restricted to non – political determinants of private investment; seeks to uncover those 
factors that really matter to private investment, other than politics. Results indicate that 
population growth; exports and private sector credit are the most powerful factors that affect 
private investment in Burundi. The results provide a concrete justification for the policy 
recommendations suggested. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Burundi is a “low opportunity” economy [22]. The country is relatively small when compared to 
most East African countries and yet it is overpopulated with at least 6 million people divided into 
3 ethnic groups, namely; the Hutus, the Tutsis and the Twas. Burundi is essentially rural, with an 
urbanization rate of approximately 9%. The country’s isolation within a geographically isolated 
continent [11], compounds the challenges to Burundi’s investment growth. According to [24], 
private investment can be defined as “the privately owned part of the economy, that part of the 
free market economy which is made up of firms that are neither owned nor managed by the 
government”. Without private investment, there cannot be meaningful growth in Burundi. 
Policies currently being implemented in Burundi will never stimulate the country’s “bed-ridden” 
economy unless they give private investment the attention it deserves.  
Background of the study 
Overview of the economy and private investment in Burundi 
In Burundi, the state is at the centre of economic activity. The ruling elite always ensure that 
their hold on political power guarantees them total control over the economy and its rents. 
Burundi, just like any other developing country suffers from both rampant corruption and bad 
laws. The ruling elite use their power to selfishly squander national resources. According to [23], 
bad laws hamper investment and growth. The existence of rampant corruption in Burundi can be 
attributed to selective application of law and self – aggrandizement by the political elite. In 
Burundi, enforcement of law is mainly used as a strategy for furthering personal interests of the 
ruling elite at the expense of the broader public interest.  In response to dubious and dystopian 
policies pursued by successive governments, households have retreated into subsistance 
economy while the modern private sector has remained rudimentary. Poor governance, according 
to [21], has suffocated individual expression in all forms; frustrating private initiative and 
leaving economic activity to a state machinery, ill equipped or unwilling to organize an efficient 
system of production.  
Private investment trends in Burundi 
The trends of private investment levels in Burundi from 1987 to 2015 are shown in figure 1 
below: 
 
Source of data: World Bank (2018) 
Figure 1 
The period 1987 to 2015 can be described as a period of war and unprecedented economic crisis 
in Burundi. As shown in the graph above, private investment exhibits an encouraging and yet 
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“subdued”, upward trend. In 1987, private investment’s contribution to GDP was approximately 
4.4%. This could be attributed to the 1986 structural reforms that were implemented in Burundi, 
although this is far away from the recommended minimum of at least 25% of GDP. 1988 was 
met by a bloody civil war that ensued due to preceding political tensions dating back to 1962 
when Burundi attained her independence. War has devastating effects not only on the economy 
but also on the lives of the people. 12 years later, in 1999; at the height of social unrest and 
political instability in Burundi; private investment hit its all-time low of approximately -27% of 
GDP. This is a record breaking low, even by African standards! During this period, private 
investment was literally non-existent. This is the period during which the 1993 civil war erupted, 
after the assassination of Burundi’s first democratically elected president. 
The worst performance of private investment in the year 1999 in Burundi could have been 
triggered by the deepening of the economic crisis that began in 1996 after a military coup spear-
headed by Major Pierre Buyoya who had lost the 1993 elections. 8 years later, in 2007; private 
investment in Burundi rose to approximately 13.5% of GDP. This improvement in private 
investment could be partly attributed to the Arusha Agreement for the Peace and the 
Reconcilliation of Burundi which was signed in the year 2000. Since then, private investment has 
not significantly increased, with the exception of the 3 years from 2011 up to 2013, where it hit 
an all-time high of approximately 15.2% of GDP. The above graph confirms the argument by 
[1]; that the private sector in Burundi is still in its embryonic stage.  
Burundi continues to rebuild her economy after a series of bloody civil wars that lasted a total of 
nearly 17 years (that is, basically, over the period 1988 – 2005). Political stability and the end of 
the civil war have, at least; improved economic activity in Burundi, whose economy is 
predominantly based on agriculture which contributes approximately 36% of the country’s GDP. 
The private sector is still at its infantry stage. According to [1], there are 3000 registered 
companies, mostly small and medium sized, employing only 37 000 people. The growth of the 
private sector remains constrained due to a number of factors. Using a simple Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) model, this study seeks to uncover the determinants of private investment in 
Burundi over the period 1987 to 2015. The study will only focus on non-political determinants of 
private investment over the specified period. 
Statement of the Problem 
Private investment cannot be overlooked if Burundi’s economy is to be stimulated sustainably. It 
is a public secret that for Burundi to sustain economic growth, the country needs to maintain 
private investment at a sizable proportion of GDP, preferably higher than 25% as already 
proposed by [12], who emphasize on the fact that high growth countries usually invest in excess 
of 25% of GDP. Despite all the efforts made by the government of Burundi in order to 
resuscitate the private sector, private investment in Burundi has remained very low as shown in 
figure 1 above. Apparently, the major challenge facing Burundi is to come up with investor-
friendly policies that would significantly help raise private investment, if sustainable economic 
growth is anything to go by. It is therefore imperative, to empirically analyze the determinants of 
private investment in order to advise both politicians and policy makers on how to successfully 
stimulate private investment in Burundi. 
Objectives of the study 
The main objective of this study is to find out the main determinants of private investment in 
Burundi. To achieve this objective the following specific objectives guided the study: 
i. To find out whether public investment affect private investment in Burundi 
ii. To investigate the impact of exports on private investment in Burundi 
iii. To determine whether population growth affect private investment in Burundi 
iv. To examine whether private sector credit affect private investment in Burundi 
v. To analyze the impact of current account deficits on private investment in Burundi 
vi. To assess the impact of aid on private investment in Burundi 
vii. To determine whether Gross Domestic Product (GDP or output)affect private investment 
in Burundi 
MATERIALS & METHODS 
Econometric Model 
The research employed a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, specified as below: 
PRIt = β0 + β1POPt + β2PLIt + β3NODAt + β4CADt + β5EXt + β6Yt + β7PSCt + β8IRt + µ …...……… [1] 
Where,  
PRI is domestic private investment measured as a percentage of GDP, POP is population growth 
measured in annual percentages, PLI is public investment measured as a percentage of GDP, 
NODA is aid proxied by net official development assistance, CAD is current account deficits 
measured as a percentage of GDP, EX is exports growth measured in percentages, Y is GDP 
growth measured in percentages, PSC is private sector credit as a percentage of GDP, IR is 
interest rates proxied by commercial lending rates, β0 is the model constant, (β1 – β8) are the 
estimation parameters, µ is the error term and t represents the time dimension. 
Data Sources 
Data used in this study was gathered from the World Bank (WB) online database only. The study 
data spun from 1987 to 2015. 
Diagnostic Tests 
Multicollinearity Test (Correlation Matrix) 
Table 1 
 POP PLI NODA CAD EX Y PSC IR 
POP 1.000 000        
PLI -0.091 172 1.000 000       
NODA -0.281 362 -0.354 172 1.000 000      
CA -0.554 040 -0.351 488 0.559 813 1.000 000     
EX -0.093 039 0.077 389 -0.164 049 0.074 109 1.000 000    
Y 0.628 768 0.246 333 -0.316 126 -0.447 500 -0.056 863 1.000 000   
PSC 0.092 815 -0.050612 0.344 897 -0.124 423 -0.575 692 -0.037635 1.000 000  
IR 0.314 203 -0.280 162 0.509 980 0.097 260 -0.491 709 0.062 476 0.642 267 1.000 000 
 
H0: there is perfect multicollinearity 
H1: there is no perfect multicollinearity 
Decision: We reject H0 and conclude that there is no perfect multicollinearity because all the 
values in the correlation matrix are less than 0.8. 
ARCH LM Test 
Table 2 
F-Statistic: 0.565063 Probability: 0.459536 
Obs R*-
squared: 
0.598071 Probability: 0.439315 
H0: there is autocorrelation 
H1: there is no autocorrelation 
Decision: We reject H0 since the p- value 0.459536 is insignificant; and conclude that there is no 
autocorrelation. These results complement the Durbin Watson statistic, which is 1.871277 
(which is approximately equal to 2); implying that the model does not suffer from serial 
autocorrelation. 
Misspecification Test (R2 Test) 
H0: the model is not correctly specified 
H1: the model is correctly specified 
Decision: We reject H0 because R2 is greater than 0.6, which is the rule of thumb; and conclude 
that our model has been correctly specified 
Testing for the significance of the whole model (F-statistic Test) 
H0: the model is not significant 
H1: the model is significant 
Decision: We reject H0 since the F-statistic, 27.89126; has a probability of 0. 000 000, implying 
that there is no chance of rejecting the specified model. Thus the model is correctly specified and 
valid. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION & DISCUSSION 
Presentation of Descriptive Statistics 
The following table shows descriptive statistics of the variables included in the model. The larger 
gap between the maximum and minimum implies the possible existence of outliers in the data, 
for example; aid (NODA). The relatively smaller gap in the rest of the variables indicates that 
there are no outliers in the data. Most variables (e.g NODA, EX, Y, PSC, PRI and PLI) are 
normally distributed as shown by their respective kurtosis statistics which are generally 
approximately equal to 3. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 
 PRI POP PLI NODA CAD EX Y PSC IR 
Mean          
Median 2.05 3.25 12.7 146.7 -5.45 8.1 3.5 14.5 14.25 
Maximum 15.2 3.5 32.9 527.7 1 12.9 5.5 20.1 19.5 
Minimum -27 1.4 3.9 58 -16.1 4.7 -8 4.2 12 
Std. Dev. 10.45972 0.766175 6.982836 141.4913 4.717034 1.974557 4.147472 3.96356 2.305718 
Skewness -1.137501 -0.683215 1.117401 1.038702 -0.459658 0.384601 -1.003421 -0.70392 0.438359 
Kurtosis 4.394163 1.878692 4.215313 2.684561 2.271436 3.014796 2.822219 3.101312 2.06685 
Jarque-
Bera 
8.305875 3.645205 7.549884 5.150959 1.605272 0.690538 4.735523 2.324324 1.912639 
Observatio
ns 
28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
 
Regression Model Results 
Table 4 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -14.84310 8.149251 -1.821406 0.0843 
POP 5.499411 1.647863 3.337298 0.0035 
PLI -1.074045 0.121287 -8.855422 0.00000 
NODA -0.029902 0.007405 -4.038212 0.0007 
CAD -0.477375 0.234593 -2.034913 0.0561 
EX 1.376536 0.435533 3.160576 0.0051 
Y 0.010820 0.230288 0.046984 0.9630 
PSC 0.595985 0.267619 2.226993 0.0382 
IR -0.048839 0.533460 -0.091552 0.9280 
PRIt = -14. 843 + 5.499POPt – 1.074PLIt – 0.029902NODAt – 0.477CADt + 1.377EXt + 0.012Yt + 0.596PSCt – 
0.049IRt + µt   ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. [2] 
R – Squared: 0.92150                                                                        F – Statistic: 27.89126 
Adjusted R – Squared: 0.88490                                                          Prob (F – Statistic): 0.000000 
Durbin Watson: 1.871277    
Interpretation and discussion of regression results 
Population growth (POP): The coefficient for population growth has a positive sign and is 
statistically significant at 1% level of significance. This implies that an increase in population 
growth in Burundi will lead to positive private investment growth. Apparently, a 1% increase in 
population growth in Burundi will lead to approximately 5.5% increase in private investment 
growth. These results are consistent with [2, 5, 25 & 33] and yet contrary to mainstream 
population growth theorists such as [18 & 32]. For Burundi, an increase in population growth 
implies more labour supply and presents an opportunity for private sector growth through 
industrialization. 
Public Investment (PLI): The coefficient for public investment has a negative sign and is 
statistically significant at 1% level of significance. This generally implies that an increase in 
public investment in Burundi will lead to a decrease in private sector growth. Apparently, a 1% 
increase in public investment in Burundi will lead to approximately 1.1% decrease in private 
investment. Although the results are contrary to both the “crowding-in effect” and the Keynesian 
theory of investment as well as many studies e.g [8, 15, 17, 27 & 30 ] amongst others; the results 
are however, consistent with a plethora of studies as well e.g [9, 10 & 34] who support the 
“crowding-out effect”. This means that in Burundi, public investment crowds-out private 
investment. In this case, according to [24]; the public sector competes for resources against the 
private sector and thereby reducing the money (resources) available for private investment. 
Aid (NODA): The coefficient for aid is negative and statistically significant at 1% level of 
significance, implying that an increase in aid in Burundi will lead to a decrease in private 
investment. A 1% increase in aid will lead to approximately 0.03% decrease in private 
investment. These results support foreign aid skeptics such as [7, 16, 28 & 29] amongst others 
whose school of thought argues that foreign aid does not help poor countries to grow richer but 
instead, crowds-out both private sector investment and innovation and apparently leads to 
increased government corruption and rent-seeking, undermining both economic and political 
development, enabling governments to remain unaccountable to their citizens, encouraging over-
dependency on donors and thereby effectively reducing incentives for recipient countries to 
adopt to good policies. In countries such as Burundi where leadership has a well-known record 
of catastrophic governance, foreign aid rarely works. According to [26] aid should be there to 
close those gaps that exist as a result of lack of domestic resources, not as a result of poor 
governance, greed and so forth. Foreign aid also has the potential of creating foreign exchange 
appreciation and thus affecting the competitiveness of domestic private investment. However, 
when aid is properly used, it can actually promote private investment as already argued by 
several aid optimists e.g [3, 4 & 31] amongst others. For example, aid in the form of Official 
Development Assistance may be used to complement other sources of financing required for 
development especially in countries like Burundi where private investors are reluctant to invest 
with the fear of low profit. 
Current Account Deficits (CAD): The coefficient for current account deficits is negative and 
significant at 5% level of significance. This implies that an increase in current account deficits in 
Burundi leads to a decrease in private investment. In fact, a 1% increase in current account 
deficits leads to approximately 0.5% decrease in private sector growth. These results are 
acceptable because current account deficits complicate domestic demand management policies, 
making it virtually impossible for policy makers to reasonably manage the economy; thereby 
frustrating investors. For example, [19] argue that pursuing a tight monetary policy in order to 
dampen demand pressures; can be in vain, because it can create supply bottlenecks by 
complicating investment and fuelling inflationary pressures. Therefore, current account deficits, 
as also highlighted in [19], have the potential to complicate the whole process of macroeconomic 
policy making. 
Exports (EX): The coefficient for exports is positive and statistically significant at 1% level of 
significance. This implies that when there is an increase in exports in Burundi, there will be 
private sector growth. Apparently, a 1% increase in exports in Burundi will lead to 
approximately 1.2% increase in private investment. Exports enable investors in Burundi to earn 
foreign exchange which they can use to import those items which are relatively scarce in their 
production activities and hence improve their efficiency. According to [13], Burundi’s primary 
exports are coffee and tea, which account for 70% of foreign exchange earnings; though exports 
are a relatively small share of GDP. The government of Burundi must pursue export 
diversification, especially in areas such as tropical fruit, vegetables, cut flowers, exotic plants, 
essential oils, mineral products as well as tourism. It is important to note that rehabilitation and 
reform in these “export zones” is a matter that should be taken seriously. This can be done by 
immediately withdrawing the state from economic activities in these sectors through 
privatization. 
Private Sector Credit (PSC): The coefficient for private sector credit is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level of significance. This generally implies that an increase in 
private sector credit in Burundi will lead to an increase in private sector investment. Specifically, 
a 1% increase in private sector credit in Burundi will lead to approximately 0.6% increase in 
private investment. Our results are consistent with mainstream economic theorists e.g [6, 14 & 
27] amongst others who maintain the proposition that private sector credit is essential for 
investment. Changes in the volume of bank credit to the private sector, as noted by [20 & 27]; 
are suggested to have a positive impact on investment activity among developing countries. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study recommends the following: 
i. Based on the negative impact of public investment on private investment in Burundi, the 
government of Burundi should move away from its tendency of “squandering” resources 
on non-infrastructural projects. Successive governments ought to focus on building the 
nation and promoting peace and stability rather than devoting their efforts on military 
endeavors. When public investment is highly concentrated on infrastructural projects, it is 
likely to be complementary to private investment in the sense that infrastructure projects 
such as road networks construction, building of schools and hospitals as well as 
telecommunication networks; promote private sector development and expansion. 
ii. The government of Burundi should put in place measures to encourage population growth 
because at the moment population growth in Burundi is not posing any threat as far as 
domestic private sector growth is concerned. Such measures may include discouraging 
“continuous” use of contraceptives, especially for the married couples as well as 
improving health service delivery to address both maternal and crude death rates. 
iii. The government of Burundi should offer incentives to exporters in order to enhance 
export-led private sector growth. 
CONCLUSION 
Private investment is essential for innovation, economic growth and poverty reduction. Countries 
with significantly deeper private sector investments are normally characterised by higher growth. 
Therefore, the importance of private investment to Burundi is not questionable; and the 
government of Burundi cannot afford to turn a blind eye on private investment in its strategic 
policy mapping processes. The main objective of this study was to analyze the determinants of 
private investment in Burundi. 
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